The Sony XCP Rootkit debacle is really just a telltale sign of something much more ominous, as Bruce Schneier explains in Sony's DRM Rootkit: The Real Story:
[I]f you can't trust Sony not to infect your computer when you buy its music CDs, can you trust it to sell you an uninfected computer in the first place? That's a good question, but -- again -- not the real story.
[...]
The story to pay attention to here is the collusion between big media companies who try to control what we do on our computers and computer-security companies who are supposed to be protecting us.
[...]
What happens when the creators of malware collude with the very companies we hire to protect us from that malware?
We users lose, that's what happens. A dangerous and damaging rootkit gets introduced into the wild, and half a million computers get infected before anyone does anything.
Who are the security companies really working for? It's unlikely that this Sony rootkit is the only example of a media company using this technology. Which security company has engineers looking for the others who might be doing it? And what will they do if they find one? What will they do the next time some multinational company decides that owning your computers is a good idea?
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Posted by: Moranguita | 2005.11.26 at 21:45